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s I began my work on this article, the news out of, and the commentary
about, Afghanistan was grim. For example, a United Nations human rights
team has reportedly found "convincing evidence" that ninety civilians, including
sixty children, were killed in airstrikes on a village in western Afghanistan. l According to a Time magazine article:
There has been a dramatic series of recent attacks by the Taliban: a mass assault on jail
freed hundreds of prisoners, and a suicide bombing outside the Indian Embassy on
July 7 killed 40 and inju red over 100. Manyofthese assaults are planned and supported
from safe havens across the border in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Western casualties are
climbing; the last two months exceeded the monthly death toll in Iraq. On July 13, nine
U.s. soldiers were killed when Taliban fighters swanned over their base in the eastern
p rovince ofKunar- the worst attack in th ree years.2

In response to the Taliban attacks from the tribal areas of Pakistan, President
George W. Bush has reportedly authorized attacks by US special operations fo rces
against the Taliban in Pakistan} This in rum has precipitated a strong protest from the
newly elected Pakistani government of Asif Ali Zardari, including a promise by Pakistan's top army officer to defend the country's sovereignty "at all COSts."4
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There are also recent claims that Afghanistan has become a "narco-State."s According to these claims, Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, and the
Afghan government are deeply involved in
protecting the opium trade--by shielding it from American-designed policies. While it
is true that Karzai's Taliban enemies fmance themselves from the drug trade, so do
many of his supporters. At the same time, some of our NATO allies have resisted the
anti-opium offensive, as has our own Defense Department, which tends to see
counternarcotics as other people's business to be settled once the war-fighting is over.
The trouble is that the fighting is unlikely to end as long as the Taliban can finance
themselves through drugs--and as long as the Kabul government is dependent on
opium to sustain its own hold on power.1>
Even if one would not go so far as to agree with a recent statement by a European
diplomat with substantial experience in Afghanistan that Afghanistan is "in its
worst shape since 2001,"7 it seems dear that the United States and its allies are currently facing serious challenges in Afghanistan. It is also clear that many of the challenges raised by developments in Afghanistan constitute major challenges to
international law and international institutions. The thesis of this article is that
these challenges will require the United States and other members of the world
community to make hard choices that will significantly affect the future ofinternational law.
I will begin with a discussion of the backdrop to the current crisis in Afghanistan, starting with the events that led to the invasion by US and allied forces in
200 I.In this section, as well as in subsequent sections of this article, the focus is primarily, but by no means exclusively, on issues oftheju5 ad bellum, the law of resort
to the use of armed force; the jus in bello, the law regulating the way the armed force
is employed, i.e., the law of armed conflict; and international human rights. I will
also explore some issues of governance, the roles of the United Nations and NATO,
problems created by the use of the tribal areas in Pakistan by the Taliban and aI
Qaeda as a safe haven, and the impact on Afghanistan of the current unstable political situation in Pakistan.

The Backdrop
It may come as a surprise to some in light of the highly negative images of Afghanistan created by the reign of the Taliban that Afghanistan enjoyed substantial periods of stability and enlightened governance. 6 The period of stability began after
King Amanullah Khan (1919-29) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain, a
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reality established by the Treaty of Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919. Reportedly,
Khan was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which
all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir
Shah (1929-33), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. "Zahir Shah's reign
(1933-73) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for
women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair.'>9 He made,
however, what was possibly a fatal mistake when he entered into a significant political and purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
In the 1970s, Afghanistan slid into instability when the diametrically opposed
Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. As he was receiving
medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong State involvement in the economy. The Communist Party overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur
Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a
rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change, in part by redistributing
land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic
parties opposed to such moves. On December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union sent
troops into Afghanistan to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias,
known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). During their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.
The Soviet occupation forces failed in their attempts to pacify the country. A
major reason for this failure was that the mujahedin benefitted from US weapons
and assistance, provided by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-SelVices Intelligence directorate (lSI). Especially useful
in combat were portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called "Stingers,"
which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. Also useful to the mujahedin
was a large network of natural and man-made tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan, in which they hid and stored weaponry.
As the Soviet losses mounted, Soviet domestic opinion turned against the war.
In 1986, after Mikhail Gorbachev came into power, the Soviets replaced Karmal
with the director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first
name). On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a UN-brokered accord (the
Geneva Accords) requiring the Soviet Union to withdraw. The withdrawal was
completed by February IS, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government.
On September 13, 199 1, the Russian and US governments agreed to a cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants. With Soviet backing withdrawn, Najibullah's
position became untenable. His government fell, and the mujahedin regime came
into power on April 18, 1992.
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There were major differences among the mujahedin factions, however, and civil
war ensued (1992-96). Four years of civil war led to increased support for the
Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. The Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.10
It didn't take long for the Taliban regime to lose international and domestic
support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and
employed harsh punishments, including summ ary executions. The Taliban authorized its "Ministry fo r the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice" to use
physical punishments to enforce str ict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or
working outside the home except in health care, and it publicly executed some
wom en for adultery. In March 2001, the Taliban committed the act that gained the
most international condemnation: it blew up two large statues calVed into hills
above Bam iyan city that were widely recognized as works of art, as representations
of idolatry.
The Taliban's hosting of al Qaeda's leaders increasingly concerned the Clinton
administration. In April 1998, then-US Ambassador to the United Nations Bill
Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but
the Taliban refused to do so. Afterthe August 7, 1998 al Qaeda bom bings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton administration increased the pressure
on the Taliban, imposing US sanctions and gaining adoption of UN sanctions as
well . On August 20, 1998, the United States fi red cruise missiles at alleged al Qaeda
training camps in eastern Afghanistan but fa iled to hit bin Laden. According to reports, Clinton administration officials said " they did not try to oust the Taliban
from power with US military force because domestic US support for those steps
was then lacking and the Taliban's opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold US values."1l
For its part, the George W. Bush administration initially largely continued the
Clinton administration's policy toward Afghanistan-applying economic and political pressure while retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from providing military assistance to the Northern Alliance, the primary opponents of the
Taliban. Its major deviation from the Clinton administration's policy was to intensify talks with Pakistan in an effort to end its support of the Taliban.
Although it was fighting with some Iranian, Russian and Indian fm ancial and
military support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kab ul in 1996. By the time of the Septem ber 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75 percent of the country. The Alliance suffered a major setback on
September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah
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Masud, the leader of the Northern Alliance and a highly respected military strategist, was assassinated by alleged al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists.

The September 11 Attacks a"d Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11, 200 1 attacks, the policy of the Bush administration toward
Afghanistan changed dramatically: it decided to overthrow the Taliban by military
force when it refused to surrender bin Laden to the United States. Prior to the
United States taking military action against Afghanistan, the UN Security Council
adopted two resolutions: Resolution 1368 12 and Resolution 1373.13 In the preamble of Resolution 1368 the Security Council recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter" and in its first
operative paragraph its determination that such acts (i.e., the terrorist attacks of
September 11 ) are "a threat to international peace and security." In its fifth operative paragraph the Council "expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 .... " Declaring the September
11 attacks as a threat to international peace and security brings them within the
scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and acts as a possible predicate to a UN enforcement action. Expressing its willingness to "take all necessary steps to respond"
to the terrorist attacks implies that the Council might in the future, if necessary, establish a peace enforcement force or authorize the use offorce by member States. 14
Recognizing that the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense applies
to the September 11 attacks appears at first blush to be mere surplusage, but has
significance for two reasons. First, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the right to
individual or collective self-defense is only an interim right-"until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The express recognition of the right in this instance arguably implies that the
Council has no intention to intervene in such a way as to suspend the right l5 and
would, of course, face a certain veto by the United States should it attempt to do so.
Second, there are those who argue that the right of individual or collective selfdefense applies only to an "armed attack" by a State and not to armed attacks by
non-State actors. To the contrary it has been argued that in Resolution 1368 the Security Council has implicitly recognized that the right of individual or collective
self-defense applies equally to attacks by non-State actors and attacks by States. 16
In the preamble of Resolution 1373, the Security Council reaffirms Resolution
1368 and "its unequivocal condemnation" of the 911 1 terrorist attacks, its determination that the attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security, the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, and "the need to combat by
all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to
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international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." In the rest of this landmark Resolution, however, the Council shifted its foc us away from the 9/1 1 attacks
and Afghanistan to actions that States must take to "prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts," a subject outside the scope of this artid e.
Major combat in Afghanistan began on October 7, 200 1. The campaign was
given the name "Operatio n Enduring Freedom."11 Even before President Bush's
September 20, 200 1 address to a joint session of Congress, in which he issued an ultimatum to the Taliban that it deliver to US authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda
" who hide in your land" or "share in their fate,"lll the United States had entered
into extensive diplomatic negotiations with its allies, seeking their understanding
of, and ideally cooperation for, a military response. A key breakthro ugh was with
then-president General PelVez Musharraf of Pakistan. Although Pakistan's intelligence selVices had supported the Taliban in its rise to power and Islamic groups in
Pakistan objected to cooperation with the United States, Musharrafpromptlycondemned the attacks and the Taliban for harboring bin Laden, and agreed to allow
the United States and its allies to use Pakistani airspace and eventually airbases. The
form er Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, which faced internal threats from al Qaeda-linked Islamist movem ents, agreed to permit US
forces to operate from bases in their territory in exchange for increased US aid and
closer political and security ties. Although several European States offered to provide military support, the United States decided to rely primarily on its own forces
and those of the Northern Alliance, with limited military assistance from British,
Canadian and Australian troops.
Combat operations in Afghanistan initially consisted prim arily of US airs trikes
on Taliban and al Qaeda forces, aided by joint efforts between small numbers (approximately one thousand) of US special operations forces and the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. At the height of the fighting in October
through Decem ber 200 1, som e US ground units (about thirteen hundred Marines)
moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Kandahar, but there were
few pitched battles between US and Taliban forces. Most of the ground combat was
between the Taliban and its Afghan opponents. 19
A key turning point in the conflict came when Taliban forces lost Mazar-eSharif on November 9, 2001. The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly thereafter.
Northern Alliance forces entered Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, on November
12, 2001, to "general jubilation."2o The Taliban subsequently lost the south and
east to pro-US Pashtun leaders, such as Hamid Karzai, the current president of Afghanistan. The end of the Taliban regime is generally dated as December 9, when
the Taliban surrendered Kandahar, leaving it under tribal law administered by
Pashtun leaders.21
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Some of the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda troops retreated to tunnel complexes built to house mujahedin fighting the Soviets, such as at Tora Bora, near the
Pakistani border. On December 16, supported by US precision bombing, local
forces the Americans dubbed the "Eastern Alliance" capt ured Tora Bora. There
was no follow-up, however, by the Eastern Alliance and insufficient US ground
forces, to prevent hundreds of al Qaeda members, possibly including bin Laden,
fro m escaping into the relatively lawless tribal regions of Pakistan. A later attack on
an al Qaeda cave complex in February and March 2002 was more successful. This
time, over one thousand US infantrymen led the assault, called Operation Anaconda, against regrouping al Qaeda in the Shah-i-kot valley, and succeeded in preventing most of the al Qaeda fighters from escaping.
Thereafter, remnants of al Qaeda mostly scattered to tribal areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Cooperative combat operations between the US and allied forces and
some local warlords continued, but these were small in comparison with the scale
of Operation Anaconda or the campaign at Tora Bora. O n May I, 2003, thenSecretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced an end to "major combat operations."22
Before turning to the post-conflict efforts toward stabilization and reconstruction, let us consider a few jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues that arose prior to or
during the major combat operations in Afghanistan. We have already briefly considered the claim that the United States and its allies violated the jus ad bellum because Article 5 1 of the UN Charter does not permit the use of armed force in selfdefense against an armed attack by non -State actors.23 Yoram Dinstein has noted
that, "[iln the past, many commentators admittedly argued that the expression
'armed attack' in Article 51 does not apply to every anned attack, 'regardless of the
source,' but only to an armed attack by another State . "2~ Dinstein goes on to state,
however, that given the response of the international community to 9/1 1, "all lingering doubts on this issue have been dispelled.» The responses of the international
community to the 9/ 11 events cited by Dinstein include Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373; the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which provides that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North
America "shall be considered an attack against them all," by the Atlantic Council;25
and a resolution by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, acting as an Organ of Consultation, in application of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
stating that "these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks
against all American States. "26
Assuming that the shocking nature of the attacks of9/1 1, and the international
community's response to them, dispels any doubts that they constituted an armed
attack within the scope of Article 51, it does not necessarily follow that any use of
armed fo rce by terrorists constitutes such an "armed attack" This remains a
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debatable issue, and we shall return to it later in this article when we consider the
legality of the US use of armed force against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan P
The increased use of high-technology warfare in Afghanistan, especially the use
of so-called "smart bombs," guided by Global Positioning System satellites, resulted in relatively low civilian casualties. Nonetheless, there were some mistakes
made,28 and the US military was criticized fo r some operations that resulted in civilian casualties.29 As noted at the beginning of this article, the issue of allegedly excessive civilian casualties has become especially acute recently, and we will return
to it later.
Another self-defense issue arising out of Operation Enduring Freedom is
whether the right of self-defense encompasses "regime change" or the removal of
the government in power, in this case the Taliban . In the case of the Persian Gulf
conflict of 1991 against Iraq, there was no "march to Bagdad" to remove the
Saddam H ussein regime. Rather, President George H.W . Bush made the political
decision to stop the attack in Iraq well short of an invasion of Bagdad . It is debatable whether Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized member States to
use armed force against Iraq if it failed to comply fully with its resolutions on or before Jan uary 15, 1991 , could have been interpreted to allow the removal of the
Saddam Hussein regime. 30
With respect to O peration Enduring Freedom, some have questioned whether
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter permitted the removal of the
Taliban from power. 31 Arguably, while it was permissible for Enduring Freedom to
eliminate the military capacity of the Taliban and al Qaeda, in order to prevent a
fu ture attack by them, "[elliminating the whole government structure created by
the Taliban, as a war aim, was beyond necessary self- defense" and therefore a disproportionate use of force.31
Interestingly, US Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly indicated that the
United States would not seek to eliminate the Taliban entirelyH and that Northern
Alliance forces had promised US officials they would not enter KabuL34 Under
these circumstances, the United States "may not be responsible for a disproportionate use offorce."35
From this account, however, it appears that, although the United States may not
have intended to eliminate the Taliban entirely, because it hoped to attract moderate Taliban to the US side, it did intend to replace the radical Taliban leaders and to
ensure that the new government of Afghanistan would not follow the policies of
these Taliban leaders. It is questionable, at best, whether this goal would be incom patible with the right of self-defense.
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Post-War Stabilizntion and Reconstruction
Despite George W. Bush's sharp criticism of "nation building" during his 2000
election campaign, it was immediately apparent to the Bush administration that
nation building was urgently required in Afghanistan. Moreover, despite the distrust of the United Nations by many in the administration, President Bush called
on the United Nations to help rebuild a post-war Afghanistan. During the 1990s,
after playing a major role in ending the Soviet occupation, the United Nations employed a succession of mediators in an effort to achieve a government selected by a
traditional assembly, or loya jirga. 36 These efforts were unsuccessful, however, because UN-mediated cease-fires between warring factions always broke down.
Non-UN initiatives also made little progress, particularly the "Six Plus Two" multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 Y
Although he had resigned in frustration in 1999, immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, former UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back. On November 14, 200 1, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1378,38
which called for a "central" role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and invited member States to send peacekeeping forces to
promote stability and the delivery of aid. After the fall of Kabul in November 200 I,
the United Nations invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern
Alliance and that of the former king-but not the Taliban-to a conference in
Bonn, Germany.39
On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the Bonn Agreement. 40 It was endorsed by the Security Council on December 6, 2001.41 Ironically, the Agreement
was reportedly forged with substantial Iranian diplomatic help because of Iran's
support for the Northern Alliance. According to Katzman, the Agreement, among
other things:
• fonned the interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai.
• authorized an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in
Kabul and directed Northern Alliance forces to withdraw from the capital.
(Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) provided formal Security
Council authorization for the international peacekeeping force.)
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on
counter-narcotics, crime and terrorism .
• applied the Afghan Constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution
could be drafted. 42
Inside the United Nations, there was strong sentiment in favor of democratic reforms. During the 1990s, successive UN resolutions on Afghanistan called for
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"broad-based, representative government with a commitment to human rights
and, increasingly, women's rights. "H This sentiment, which was strongly supported by the US government, is reflected in the Bonn Agreement. Yet the international commitment to democratization was potentially a liability, as well. As noted
by one commentator:
The post-Taliban democratization process was from the outset more heavily
internationalized than other reforms in Afghan history except under the
communists. Reforms during the monarchy in the 19205 were certainly influenced by
foreign ideas, but apart from a small number of foreign advisors they were very much
an Afghan operation. The same applied to Zahir Shah's democratic reforms in 1964.
This time, by contrast, the UN launched a visibly internationalized democratization
process. Foreign experts virtually flooded into the country to help implement the
transition schedule of the Bonn Agreement. The visibility of the foreign hand in the
reforms was exemplified du ring the 2005 elections, when the UN had 40 million
ballot papers printed in Europe and Australia and flown into Afghanistan. The
foreign role was accentuated by the widespread presence of international consultants
in the new administration as a whole. While many experts were Afghans returning
from exile, often temporarily, they worked for international salaries. This hardened
the distinction between "the locals" (on local salary) and "the internationalists" (on
international salaries).4-4

This anti-foreigner sentiment continued and intensified to the point Afghans soon
referred to foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "cows that drink their
own milk."45 Perhaps the most important policy impact of foreign involvement in Afghanistan was "the extreme dependence of the emerging Afghan state on international
assistance."46 The size of the US economic and military contribution in particular gave
it paramount influence. By 2004, US aid accounted for over half of all recorded donor
assistance to the government budget. As a result of its large financial contribution and
extensive presence in Afghanistan, the United States "effectively underwrote the very
survival of the government, as President Hamid Karzai publicly admitted, and wielded
an implicit veto over all issues it considered important."47
President Karzai exercised decisive influence over the process of promulgating a
new constitution. In accordance with established tradition, a small committee of
experts prepared a first draft, which was reviewed by a larger commission. The final
step would be the calling of a lora jirga to deliberate and approve a text. During the
early drafting process, a critical issue emerged as to the fo rm the government
should take: a purely presidential system or a mixed structure with a prime minister. The debate divided along ethnic lines. The non-Pushtun minorities, including
the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen and Qizilbash, strongly favored the traditional
position of a prime minister as a way to counter the influence of a Pashtun
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president. They, therefore, wanted a power-sharing mechanism and favored a
mixed system with a president and a prime minister, the latter preferably to be
elected by the parliament. The Pashtuns argued, however, that Afghanistan needed
a strong executive in order to overcome the catastrophic divisions of the past and
to provide a unifying leadership for the future. Hence, in their view, a purelypresidential system was best. After a period of time, the drafting process was removed
from the commission and "proceeded in a 'secretive and unaccountable manner'
in the office ofKarzai."48When the document was made public a couple of months
later, in November 2003, the position of prime minister had been eliminated; instead, two vice presidents selected by the president had been added. 49 Karzai's success in overcoming a "varied and collectively powerfu1 opposition during the
constitutional process derived primarily fro m his relationship with the United
States," but "the parliamentary issue left a deep scar among the minorities."so
Speaking of parliament, a controversial issue arose regarding the election system to be employed to select members of the parliament for Afghanistan. Although
political parties were allowed-about sixty were registered with the Ministry of
Justice-the government chose a system that prevented political parties from formally fielding candidates. The election system chosen is called the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) . In the 2005 elections its use meant that voters could
choose among individual candidates in multi-member constituencies, but there
were no party lists and no party identification of candidates on the ballot. With no
formal party affiliations allowed, there was no proportional representation according to party strength. As one commentator noted:
As an institution of political democracy, the SNTV was deeply flawed. Without
electoral recognitio n of political parties, the parliament was likely to be fragmented and
weak, with little capacity to aggregate local interests, address national-level issues,
provide dear lines of accountability to the voters and thus, in the end, check the power
of the executive branch .. . . The limitations of a non-party election system were
common knowledge. Most of the diplomatic community in Afghanistan, the UN
mission in Kabul (UNAMA), and virtually all resident international experts and civil
society groups warned against adopting the SN1V.... Yet Karzai resisted, and after a
year-long debate pushed the SNIV through a final Cabinet decision in February
2005.$1

The public argument made in favor of the SNTV by Karzai was that Afghanistan
had historically had many bad experiences with political parties. The Communist
Party had left a legacy of extreme violence, as had the civil war among the political
factions during the early 199Os. According to Karzai, an election system that
strengthened the role of political parties would likely institutionalize ethnic
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divisions and work against national reconciliation and unity. Therefore, it was
preferable to have an election system where voters would vote for individuals
rather than parties. Karzai's ability to have the SNTV adopted was reportedly dependent upon strong US support, including a brusque intervention by American
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad at a meeting with UN officials and diplomats in
Kabul, who declared that "he had just spoken to President Bush, who said 'SNTV is
the choice. SNTV is going to happen."'52 Arguably, "[tJhe institutional arrangement suited Washington's primary policy objective in Afghanistan, which was not
to promote political democracy but to eliminate terrorists and A1 Qaida. "53
In any event, the process resulted in the election of a substantial n umber of alleged war criminals and drug traffickers in the parliament, which undermined the
legitimacy of the democratic system. Moreover, as previously noted, the national
budget was heavily dependent upon foreign funding. In 2005, around 90 percent of
the total budget was based on foreign receipts. "Only the operating budget, which
represented about one-fourth of the total, was managed by the government. The
rest was the development, or 'external' budget, which the donors controlled more
directly. As a result, the power of the parliament was extremely limited with regard
to both taxation and spending." :>4
Not surprisingly, relations between Karzai and parliament have often been contentious. Nonetheless, they are both trying to improve and expand governance
throughout the country. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 28, 2008, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell stated
that the Karzai government controls only 30 percent of the country, while the
Taliban controls 10 percent, and tribes and local groups control the remainder. 55
US and NATO officials in Kabul, however, told CBS in March 2008 that they disagreed with this assessment because it is too pessimistic. 56 There is a debate in Afghanistan over whether the focus should contin ue to be on strengthening the
central government-the approach favored by the Karzai government and the
United States and most of its partner5---Qr to promote local solutions to security
and governance problems, an approach some international partners, such as Great
Britain, would like to explore.
Despite its relatively weak position, parliament has asserted itself on several occasions. For example, it exercised its prerogatives in the process of confirming a
postelection cabinet and in forcing Karzai to remove several prominent conservatives from the Supreme Court and replacing them with jurists more experienced in
modern jurisprudenceY In mid-2007, parliament promulgated a law granting
amnesty to commanders who fought in the various Afghan wars since the Soviet
invasion in an effort to improve the chances for greater stability as Afghanistan attempts to rebuild itself as a modern nation. In the course of debate on the
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legislation, the law was rewritten to give victims the right to bring accusations of
past abuses forward . Its status, however, is unclear because, although Karzai did
not veto the legislation, neither did he sign it.
In spite of the tensions between them, the executive and the parliament have cooperated with respect to less contentious issues, such as the adoption of a labor law,
a mines law, a lawon economic cooperatives and a convention on tobacco control.
The legislature also confirmed Karzai nominees fo r a new Minister of Refugee Affairs, the head of the Central Bank and the fmal justice to complete the composition of the Supreme Court. 58
The United Nations has been extensively involved in the post-war stabilization
and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Some of the debate over the predominant role of the United States and its partners was reflected in a proposal to create a
new position of "super envoy" that would represent the United Nations, the European Union and NATO in Afghanistan. The proposal would subsume the role of
the head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In January 2008,
with US support, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon tentatively appointed British diplomat Paddy Ashdown to this "super envoy" position, but Karzai rejected
the appointment, reportedly over concerns about the scope of the authority of Mr.
Ashdown, especially whether it might dilute the US role in Afghanistan. There has
also been speculation that Karzai wished to show his independence from the international community. Ashdown withdrew his name on Jan uary 28,2008.59
On March 20, 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1608,60 which extended UNAMA's mandate for another year and expanded its authority to include
some of the "super envoy" concept. UNAMA coordinates the joint Afghaninternational community coordination body called the loint Coordination and
Monitoring Board , and Resolution 1806 directs UNAMA to coordinate the work
of international donors and strengthen cooperation between the international
peacekeeping force (ISAF, International Security Assistance Force; see below) and
the Afghan government. The head of UNAMA, as of March 2008, is Norwegian
diplomat Kai Eide. In April 2008, in Washington, D.C., Eide stated that additional
capacity building resources are needed and that some efforts by international donors are redundant or tied to purchases by Western countries. 61
There is little doubt that inadequate resources, both for security and reconstruction purposes, have been and remain a p rimary problem in Afghanistan. The problem, moreover, is lack of both financial resources and human capital in a country
that is one of the poorest on earth, with a literacy rate estimated at only 30 percent.
The recent deterioration in the security situation is especially disquieting.
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Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building

As noted previously, after the negotiation of the Bonn Agreement, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1386 on December 20, 200 1, which established ISAF
to aid the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining peace and security in Kabul
and its surrounding areas, "so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment."62 To this end,
the Resolution authorized ISAF to take " all necessary measures" to fulfill the peacekeeping mission. 6) Everyone recognized that "all necessary measures" might include the use of force. The Resolution also called upon m ember States "to
contribute personnel, equipm ent and other resources to the [ISAFj,"64 and "calls
on Member States participating in the [ISAFj to provide assistance to help the
Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. "65
It is important to no te that Resolution 1386 envisaged that ISAF would be a
peacekeeping force in the classic sense. Although ISAF was authorized to take " necessary measures" to fulfill its mandate, which implied that force might have to be
used, the initial limitation of its operations to Kabul and its surrounding areas indicated that the use of force contemplated would be in the nature of actions in selfdefense, a use of force characteristic of peacekeeping operations. There is no language in the Resolution that implies the use of force to enforce peace. Rather, peace
enforcement responsibility lay with separate US fo rces who sought to track down
Taliban and al Qaeda remnants, which were largely located in the southern and
eastern portions of the country near the border with Pakistan.
The composition of ISAF originally consisted of approximately forty-six hundred troops from 122 different States. 66 The leadership of ISAF initially rotated
among the Western nations, but NATO took over leadership of ISAF in August
2003 . This was NATO's first and so far only mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area
in its history. At the time ISAF's primary goals were "to assist in maintaining security, develop Afghan national security structures, assist the nation's reconstruction,
and aid the training of Afghan security forces. "67
Although Resolution 1386 initially limited ISAF to Kabul, its area of responsibility had been expanded to include about 50 percent of the country before August
2006, when it further extended its role to take over the lead military role from US
troops in southern Afghanistan. In other words, ISAF had evolved from a peacekeeping force to one d early involved in enforcing the peace against rejuvenated
Taliban and al Qaeda forces. As one European official in NATO reportedly stated,
"When NATO agreed to expand its control to southern Afghanistan in 2006, no
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one really anticipated the difficulty in the fighting. Maybe we were in denial, but
this has been a culture shock for a lot of US."68
For their part, US officials have been frustrated by what they perceive as a failure
on the part of some NATO members to bear their fair share of the fighting. For example, the United States has been asking its NATO allies to provide more troops to
stabilize the military situation in Afghanistan but has discovered that "some allies
appear more eager to reduce their forces than to add to them."69 US Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates has credited the Netherlands, Britain, Australia and Canada
with "doing their part in Afghanistan," but indicated that other NATO m embers
have contributed far less. 7o For its part, Canada threatened to withdraw from the
southern province of Kandahar early next year (2009) unless other NATO countries agreed to send one thousand additional combat troops there, a threat that was
met when France agreed to contribute the extra troops.1 1 Tensions within the alliance have also risen because of the unwillingness of some members, including Germany, Italy and Spain, to send troops to the south of Afghanistan, where the bulk of
the fighting is taking place. 72
Secretary Gates has recently emphasized "the direct threat posed to European
security by extremists in and around Afghanistan" in a speech reflecting growing
American concerns that weak public support risked undermining NATO's mission
in the country.73 As evidence of increased danger to Europe from terrorist attacks,
Gates cited, among other things, the arrest offourteen extremists in Barcelona, suspected of planning attacks against public transport systems in Spain, Portugal,
France, Germany and Britain. On the reluctance of European States to commit
more troops to Afghanistan, or to allow those already there to move to the south
and other areas where the fighting was most intense, Gates warned against the alliance becoming a two-tiered coalition, of those willing to fight and those who were
not. He reportedly added that "[sJuch a development, with all its implications for
collective security, would effectively destroy the alliance. "74
The sam e European official who reported that NATO members suffered "culture shock" when they realized how difficult fighting in southern Afghanistan
would be, reportedly recognized the contin uing frustration of American officials
when he said, "American officials were frustrated when the alliance had 35,000
troops in Afghanistan but only 8,000 troops in the volatile south, and they are still
unsatisfied with NATO's 52,000 troops in Afghanistan and 22,000 in the south."7S
Both Barack Obama and John McCain, the contenders in the 2008 presidential
elections, supported a troop "surge" in Afghanistan. Senator McCain proposed
moving troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, conditional on continued progress in
Iraq. Senator Obama's proposal is much more radical; he argues that we should
have sent the 2007 surge to Afghanistan, not Iraq, that Afghanistan is the "central
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front" and that we must rebuild Afghanistan "from the bottom up along the lines
of the Marshall Plan."16 Secretary of Defense Gates has also supported the idea of a
surge in Afghanistan. He has endorsed a $20 billion plan to increase substantially
the size of Afghanistan's army, as well as the role and n umbers of Western troops
there to aid it.
Serious questions have been raised, however, about the validity of this thesis.
For example, although denying sanctuary for terrorists-in Afghanistan and elsewhere-has been put forth as a rationale for increased troop strength, it has been
argued that "[alccomplishing it . . . requires neither the conquest of large swathes
of Afghan territory nor a troop surge there-nor even m aintaining the number of
troops NATO has in Afghanistan today. Counterterrorism is not about occupation. It centers on combining intelligence with specialized military capabilities. "n
Even if one maintains that counterterrorism in Afghanistan requires more troops
than suggested by the above argument, the question remains, how many? Dan
McNeill, the American general who was NATO's top commander in Afghanistan
until he left in June 2008, reportedly said that "according to current American
counterinsurgency doctrine, a successful occupation of Afghanistan, which is
larger, more complex, more populous and very much less governable than Iraq,
would require 400,000 troops."18
Strictly speaking, NATO is not an occupying force in Afghanistan because ISAF
was established by Security Council resolution and President Karzai has given his
permission for its presence. As noted previously, however, the large numberofforeigners in Afghanistan has raised objections from the Afghans, who have a longstanding distrust of foreigners. Tensions have been greatly exacerbated by civilian
casualties caused by NATO bombing. Karzai has demanded an end to civilian casualties. A surge of foreign troops along the lines suggested could greatly intensify
these objections and likely provoke a serious backlash.
One possible answer to this objection might be to concentrate greater attention
and resources o n training an Afghan army and police. This has proven to be a difficult goal to achieve. American commanders remain frustrated by NATO's fa ilure
to deploy the promised n umber of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs) ("O m elets" in NATO-speak) . These are twelve- to nineteen-person
training teams that serve as a vital link between forward-deployed Afghan army
and police units and ISAF support such as airpower, medical evacuations and resupply. This is a dangerous mission, as was demonstrated in June 2008, when eighteen police trainers from the SecurityTransition Command were killed in action. It
was the worst month of the conflict for that command. 79
As a consequence, some NATO States, in particular Germany, now refuse to allow their OMLTs to accom pany Afghan units into combat in the southern and
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eastern parts ofthe country. Others have failed to field the training teams at all, apparently because of the financial cost. The result is a shortage of twenty mentoring
teams and twenty-three thousand trainers.so General John Craddock, NATO's supreme allied commander in Afghanistan, has expressed his frustration at this situation in vivid terms:
I've talked at every meeting of the North Atlantic Council [NATO's governing body],
and at every foreign ministers council. At one [meeting] I brought a big cup and labeled
it "Contributions." and I reminded all the defense chiefs that their respective heads of
state agreed to meet this requirement, so where is your bid? And I didn't get anything!
So yeah, I'm frustrated. 81
Building a quality police force in Afghanistan has so far proven to be a mission
impossible because of pervasive corruption. The current seventy-nine thousand
members of Afghanistan's national police force are "better known as shakedown
artists than law enforcers. "62 Major General Robert Cone, who is in charge of the
mission to train the Afghan army and national police, points out: "The problem is
endemic corru ption in a country that had virtually no economy for 30 years other
than narco-trafficking, so the way cops made money was to stop vehicles at checkpoints and demand money."83 Many of Afghanistan 's governors are former warlords who put their cronies on the police rolls. As a result, they also are lukewarm to
police reforms. According to Cone, "[i[f you gave them truth serwn and asked if
they wanted a good, non-corrupt police force, probably only 30 percent or so
would say yes. For years, corrupt police is how they've made money. "84
Military action against the Taliban and al Qaeda has not been going well the last
two years. The toll among fore ign troops in Afghanistan has reached a new high,
with more than 230 deaths so far in 2008 among more than twenty NATO nations
contributing troops. American commanders have said that the level of violence is
up 30 percent in the past year. In July2008, for the first time, American military casualties in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq.8S A major reason for the increase of
casualties in Afghanistan has been the ability of the Taliban and al Qaeda to cross
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, launch an attack in Afghanistan and
return to their safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan. After months of US criticism, behind the scenes and in public, against Pakistan for not doing enough to
prevent such attacks, the United States launched drone strikes against targets in Pakistan and a raid by special operations forces in Pakistan's tribal areas. Pakistan reacted forcefully to these attacks and the risk grew of an anned confrontation
between Pakistani and US fo rces. But as the Taliban went deeper into Pakistan
proper and carried out major terrorist attacks like the MarriOl Hotel bom bing in
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Islamabad on September 20, 2008, Pakistan reacted and escalated its attacks on
Taliban strongholds like Swat, a settled area of the North-West Frontier Province
that was once a middle class resort.86 Fighting has been fierce, and success of the Pakistani effort is by no means assured.
For his part, President Karzai has repeatedly sought the intervention of the
Saudi royal family to bring the Taliban to peace negotiations, but without success.
Karzai has reportedly imposed conditions on bringing the Taliban into the government. These include a renunciation of violence, acceptance of Afghanistan's
democratic constitution and a repudiation of al Qaeda-all tenns the Taliban
leadership has rejected. 87
As noted earlier, there are recent claims that Afghanistan has become a "narcoState" and that Hamid Karzai and his government are deeply involved in protecting the opiwn trade and using proceeds from it to maintain themselves in power.88
At this writing, there are further reports that President Karzai's brother, Ahmed
Wali Karzai, is heavily involved in the heroin trade in Afghanistan and that President Karzai's government is protecting him. American officials in Kabul reportedly "fear that perceptions that the Afghan president might be protecting his
brother are damaging his credibility and undermining efforts by the United States
to buttress his government, which has been under siege from rivals and a Taliban
insurgency fueled by drug money. "89
I will now t urn to a consideration of the international law issues raised by the
current situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the hard choices faced by decision
makers attempting to resolve these issues, and possible impacts on the future of internationallaw of these choices.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Hard Choices and the Future of International Law
A major problem that decision makers face in dealing with the currently unsatisfactory situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan is that both nations are sovereign
States with governments selected in free elections. Although the United States and
other foreign governments involved in Afghanistan can urge that President Karzai
stop protecting drug lords and narco-fanners, they cannot order him to do so.
Much less can they decide to remove him and his government from power. To be
sure, they could, as suggested by Thomas Schweich, a former senior US Department of State counter-narcotics official, "inform President Karzai that he must
stop protecting drug lords or he will lose US support. "90 The wisdom of this recommendation, however, is highly questionable. It would seem to call for a "nuclear
option" in a situation not calling for it. As one commentator has noted:
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Neither [presidential} candidate has mentioned heroin use as a pressing domestic
issue, and there is even less reason it should be a major international one. In any case,
our demand for heroin is not the fault of the Afghan peasants who would take the
financial hit for our interdiction efforts. liberal democracies cannot win
counterinsurgencies against the wills of local populations, and denying a livelihood to
the poor farmers of southern and eastern Afghanistan is no way to persuade Afghans to
our side.91
Tensions between the Karzai government and the US government over civilian
casualties allegedly caused by airstrikes raise somewhat similar problems. Although the law of armed conflict clearly prohibits an intentional direct attack
against the civilian population as such, and indeed categorizes it as a war crime,92
"there can be no assurance that attacks against combatants and other military objectives will not result in civilian casualties in or near such military objectives. "93 In
the latter case, the civilian casualties are known as "collateral damage" and do not
give rise to accountability of the attacker. Nonetheless, as the head of the sovereign
government of Afghanistan, President Karzai can order the complete cessation of
airstrikes (he has done so on occasion), and, as a matter of international law, the
United States and its allies are bound to comply--even though such airstrikes are a
crucially important factor in the battle against the Taliban, and the Taliban regularly intenningles among the civilian population in order to use them as human
shields (itself a violation of the law of armed conflict ) and then uses civilian casualties as part of its war propaganda effort.9-4 In short, the Taliban has been successfully engaging in so-called "lawfare," using false accusations of violations of the jus
in bello in order to win public opinion to its side.
In a recent inteIView, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the nation's highest-ranking military officer, has identified the problem of how to deal with attacks by the Taliban and al Qaeda across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and their use of the tribal areas of Pakistan as a
safe haven, as the gravest he faces .95 Although he suggests that more military forces
are needed, he states, "It's not just about [sending] additional combat forces toAfghanistan.» Rather, he notes, "Afghanistan has a weak government and economy, a
huge opium trade, and an inadequate army. If those problems aren't addressed,
more troops won't help."
There is a serious question, however, whether these problems are surmountable. As raised starkly by one commentator:
But what are the real prospects for turning fractious, impoverished Afghanistan into an
orderly and prosperous nation and a potential ally of the United States? What true
American interests are being insufficiently advanced or defended in its remote deserts
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and mountains? And even if these interests are reallyso broad, are they deliverable at an
acceptable price? The answers to these questions put the wisdom of an Afghan surge
into great question . . .. The invasion of Afghanistan was a great tactical success and the
correct strategic move. Yet since then it seems as if the United States has been trying to
turn the conflict into the Vietnam War of the early 21st century. Escalating in
Afghanistan to "must-win" status means. according to General McNeil's estimate,
deploying three times as many troops as were sent to Iraq at the height of the surge. If
Americans really believe-as Senator Obama in particular argues-that Afghanistan is
the right war and a place appropriate for Iraq-style nation-building, then they must
understand both the cost involved and the remote likelihood of success.96
At this writing, Britain has reportedly backed a statement by a senior military
commander that the war against the Taliban cannot be won.97 According to the report, "the UK's ministry of defense 'did not have a problem' with warning the UK
public not to expect a 'decisive military victory' and to prepare instead for a possible deal with the Taliban."98 For its part, however, the United States is skeptical
about any idea of negotiating with the Taliban. When asked about the British commander's statement, a White House spokesman reportedly said: "We plan on winning in Afghanistan. It's going to be tough and going to take some time, but we will
eventually succeed."99
Even if there should be an eventual agreement that success in Afghanistan does
not require a complete military victory, US Joint Chiefs Chairman Michael
Mullen is surely right in suggesting that the problem along the Afghan-Pakistani
border is the one to be most concerned about for the near future and will be "front
and center on the agenda of the next president." loo As noted earlier, US and coalition forces have been frustrated by Pakistan's failure to prevent Taliban and al
Qaeda forces from crossing the border to launch attacks in Afghanistan and have
recently attacked targets in the tribal areas of Pakistan either by drones or by special operations forces. Pakistan has protested vociferously and threatened military
action against coalition forces. Most recently, however, Pakistan has reacted to
Taliban and al Qaeda attacks in Pakistan by intensifying military action against
them in Pakistan. WI
A major issue arising out of this situation is whether US and coalition forces violated international law restraints on the use of force by launching their attacks in
Pakistani territoI)'. The answer to this question has to be a resounding "maybe."
As noted previously, with respect to the 9/1 1 attacks and the issue of whether Article 51 of the UN Charter applies to armed attacks by non-State actors, Yoram
Dinstein has concluded that "all lingering doubts on this issue have been dispelled
as a result of the response of the international community to the shocking events"
of September 11.102 It is unclear, however, whether this conclusion would apply to

98

John F. Murphy
cross-border attacks by "terrorists" --or less pejoratively, "irregular forces" of a
non-State character-that do not have the extraordinary features of the 9/11 attacks
and the global response to them. Dinstein himself notes that there is considerable
scholarly comment in support of the proposition that there is no right of selfdefense under Article 51 against an armed attack by a non-State actor. This proposition is also supported by the controversial statement in the 2004 International Court
of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequetlces of tile Construction ofa Wall in
the Oaupied Palestiniatl Territory.IOJ There the court summarily dismissed Israel's
claim that it was acting in self-defense against attacks by terrorist groups. In its view,
Israel could not be acting in self-defense because Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks at issue were imputable to a foreign State and because those attacks
were not transnational in nature, having occurred wholly within territory occupied
by Israel. The opinion has been heavily criticized,Hlt however, and the court arguably backed off its view in its 2005 case concerning Anned Activities on the Territory
of the Congo, where the court stated that, given the circumstances of the case, there
was "no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as to whether and under
what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defense
against large scale attacks by irregular forces. "lOS
Assuming arguetldo that there is a right of self-defense against armed attacks by
non-State actors, there is still the requirement that the use of force in self-defense
be necessary for the object of defense and proportional to the injury threatened. 106
Although the drone attacks and special operations forces attack drew strong protests from the Pakistani government, they were arguably necessary in light of Pakistan's failure to prevent cross-border attacks and proportional to the injury they
threatened. As noted by Admiral Mullen, there is no plan to invade Pakistan,I07 and
there is evidence of a favorable shift in the Pakistani military's outlook after horrendous terrorist attacks on targets in its own country. He is also encouraged that a
tribal leader in Bajaur, a Taliban and al Qaeda stronghold along the border, has
mobilized several anti-Taliban figh ters. At the same time he recognizes that the Pakistani military does not yet have the skills or the equipment it needs. If these can
be provided, there is hope that no further cross-border attacks by US and coalition
forces will be necessary.
Even a cursory review of the foregoing discussion leads to the unhappy conclusion that efforts toward "nation building" in Afghanistan are going very badly, and
hard choices will have to be made that will have a major impact on the future of international law and international institutions. The first choice will have to be
whether having a "surge" in Afghanistan of approximately ten thousand troops is a
good idea and will contribute to winning the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Since both candidates in the US presidential election favor a surge, it is highly
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probable that such a surge will take place. As noted, however, the British government believes the war is unwinnable in the sense of a decisive military victory and
favors instead President Karzai's efforts to broker a peace settlement with the
Taliban---efforts apparently opposed by the US government. Som e critics have
gone much further and proposed a major drawdown of Western troops to a maximum of perhaps twenty thousand. In their view, this number would be sufficient,
if coupled with an intelligence operation sufficient to collect the intelligence
needed to allow special operations forces to eliminate terrorist threats as they
appear. IOS
It will also be necessary to decide whether, in light of considerable evidence of
pervasive corruption in the Karzai government, and considering the cost in lives
and treasure already expended, the efforts toward nation building should be continued . On the topic of nation building in Afghanistan, James Kitfield of the National Journal had the following to say:
The overwhelming theme of the Afghan nation-building at this time is a lack of
coordination and coherence. Everyone seems to be doing their own thing based on
different and occasionally conflicting or at least dashing agendas. The critical issue of
who should be dealing directly with Taliban leaders in proposing reconciliation, and
what they can offer them to jump to the government's side, is a case in point. The US
pushed hard for the naming of a very high profile rep in Paddy Ashdown, precisely to
instill more coherence in the effort. President Karzai apparently viewed that as a
reproach and Ashdown as a potential competitor for influence, so he nixed the idea of a
high prome UN "czar." The hopes for Ashdown's successor are more modest, but
everyone seems to think someone is still needed who can be a one-stop contact fo r civil,
international aid operations. The US military commanders in Afghanistan, and their
NATO counterparts, are very anxious that someone fill such a role so that they can get
the critical sequencing right in their "dear, hold, build" operations. 11)9

Hard choices will also have to be made as to what to do about the drug lords and
narcotics traffickers who are supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgency.
General David D. McKiernan, the top American commander in Afghanistan, has
announced that ISAF forces will step up attacks on these drug lords and narcotics
traffickers in situations where they are linked to the movement of weapons, improvised explosives or foreign fighters into Afghanistan.ll o American and NATO officials have vigorously rejected the suggestions of some NGOs that international
security forces take an active role in eradicating the poppy crops, on the ground
that such decisions should be left to the Afghan government, which would also
have to develop alternate livelihoods for the farmers. But General McKiernan has
proposed that perhaps this position should be reexamined because the fight in Afghanistan is now not only against the Taliban and al Qaeda, but also against "a very
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broad range of militant groups that are combined with the criminality, with the
narco-trafficking system, with corruption, that form a threat and a challenge to
that great country."111 The major problem with increasing the mission of the military in this fashion is that there is substantial evidence that the Karzai government
and its supporters are also receiving funds from the narco-traffickers.
With respect to the problem of cross-border attacks fro m Pakistan, the primary
issue is whether the new Pakistani government will have the will and the ability to
defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the tribal areas. General McKiernan has
reported that he is "cautiously optimistic" that a contin uing assault by Pakistani
forces against militants in the tribal area of Bajaur could put a "dent in extremist
operations in the border region." He also praised the appointment of the new head
of Pakistan's top spy organization, saying Lieutenant General Ahmed Sh uja Pasha
was likely to reform the agency, which in the past had "institutional and historical
ties to the Taliban and other militant networks."112
If, however, General McKiernan's cautious optimism turns out to be misplaced,
and cross-border attacks by Taliban, al Qaeda and other militants become a major
problem, then the choice facing US and coalition forces will be especially hard. AI;
General John Craddock has acknowledged, insurgencies that enjoy uncontested
sanctuary have rarely, if ever, been defeated. 1n
Similarly, General McKiernan, in addressing the question whether it is possible
to have a positive outcome to the Afghanistan campaign without resolving the
problem of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, has answered that "while I won' t say
it will be im possible, it will be very, very difficult."114 At the same time, McKiernan
has stated categorically that "[fJailure is not an option in Afghanistan ."ll s Hence,
the likelihood of US and NATO attacks on targets in Pakistan resuming under
these circumstances would be great. Moreover, although Robert Gates has defended earlier such attacks as justified under international law in order to protect
US troops in Afghanistan, as we have seen earlier, this is a debatable proposition,
and Gates has recognized that "Pakistan probably did not agree that international
law permitted unilateral action."116 Indeed, as we also saw earlier, Pakistan vehemently objected to the US drone and special operations attacks in the tribal areas.
One should devoutly hope that failure in Afghanistan is in fact not an option.
Robert D. Kaplan has recently suggested that "[s[ trategically, culturally, and historically speaking, Afghanistan and Pakistan are inseparable."117 Also, in his view:
[FJailure in Afghanistan would do India no favors. In Afghanistan we are not simply
trying to save a country, but to give a whole region a new kind of prosperity and
stability, united rather than divided by energy needs. that would be implicitly
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pro-American . .. . What the Pentagon calls the "long war'" is the defming geopolitical
issue o f our time, and Afghanistan is at its heart. The fate of Eurasia hang; in the balance.

But how long is this "long war" likely to be? A crucial issue, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is the time required for a well-run counterinsurgency strategy to work.
Sarah Sewall, a former Pentagon official who wrote the introduction tothe University of Chicago edition of the new U.S. Army/Manne Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual,118 for one, is skeptical that the US public will be willing to "supply greater
concentrations of forces, accept higher casualties, fund serious nation-building
and stay many long years to conduct counterinsurgency by the book. "119
If Ms. Sewall's gloomy prognosis should prove correct with respect to Afghanistan, the adverse impact on international law and international institutions would
be substantial. Failure in Afghanistan would be a catastrophic failure on the part
not only of the United States but of the world community as a whole. It would
mean that the Taliban, al Qaeda and other militant Islamic forces had managed to
defeat US and other NATO forces in ISAF, as well as US forces engaged in antiterrorism missions under Operation Enduring Freedom. This would call into serious question the future viability of NATO and of UN peacekeeping efforts. Failure
in Afghanistan would also call into question the continued viability of nationbuilding efforts, by the United Nations and others, and arguably support those
skeptical of such efforts, such as the Bush administration in its early days.
At this writing, there are reports that the Bush administration has initiated a
major review of its Afghanistan policy and that a nearly completed National IntelIigence Estimate, a formal report that reflects the consensus judgments of all
American intelligence agencies, will set forth an extremely grim assessment of the
current situation in Afghanistan, especially of the Afghan leadership and its foreign allies. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with the developments and issues discussed in this article. One must hope, however, that issuance
of the report after the 2008 presidential election will stimulate a searching review
of these developments and issues. Avoiding failure in Afghanistan will depend in
substantial measure upon a successful resolution of the many issues arising out of
the situation there.
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